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Introduction and Background
Organizations invest and divest resources to prepare for the future and respond to events or conditions in the relevant social, political, resource, or business environment (Scott, 2006) . 2 Successful preparation requires an effective and persistent process of management. Successful response requires a continuous and dynamic ability to offset threats and risks, or take advantage of opportunities. Both successful preparation and response require governance and management processes that focus decisions on the outcomes of the organization and improve the organization over time. 3 Because resources are limited, prioritization of activities and deciding what to divest from is as important as making decisions on where to invest next, whether budgets are increasing or decreasing.
^Åèìáëáíáçå=oÉëÉ~êÅÜ=mêçÖê~ãW= êÉ~íáåÖ=póåÉêÖó=Ñçê=fåÑçêãÉÇ=`Ü~åÖÉ= -229 -scale present unique challenges to successful government preparation and response efforts (Wolf, 1979) . First, the government sector in general, and the Department of Defense (DoD) in particular, is riddled with imperfect information and uncoordinated analytics. These often drive decision-makers to adopt rules of thumb (RoTs) to make what are usually suboptimal resource decisions (GAO, 2014) . Second, best and possibly new practices are needed to simplify the logic and leverage natural biases already inherent to investment/divestment decision-making. Third, improvements in these factors would increase DoD leaders' confidence of outcome impacts inherent in planning cycles, and to be more responsive to mission or fiscal disruptions.
Models of governance responsiveness are also needed to assess the ability of leaders to produce results, the accountability of leaders to do what is "right," and the desire of stakeholders to make leaders more responsive in the public sector. This paper will look at best practices in the private sector and borrow applicable concepts from other complex riskdriven domains to derive and present a framework for government decision-makers to identify and govern the systematic divestment of low performing investments across the organization and free up funds for better operational and organizational choices. The proposed construct draws a corollary between typical commercial drivers and the DoD resource impact areas of Readiness, Modernization, and Force Structure. The construct then proposes to use and assess performance criteria of organizational and operational impact, performance viability of capabilities as core competencies of an organization, and the economic value and affordability of the investment set for the DoD.
Human Decisions: "Imperfect" Resorts to Rules of Thumb
Decisions to divest are often harder than decisions to invest. 4 The culprit is often emotion or self-interest even when individuals believe they are doing the right thing. The challenge is compounded when the possession in question is providing some value, even if that value could be achieved more effectively elsewhere. For example, an organization decides to outsource an important non-core function to a specialty organization that can deliver it more effectively and cheaper than keeping it in-house. While this makes sense at an enterprise level, the internal providing unit meets the decision with resistance and reluctance driven by self-interest. In both cases, money spent or saved has direct impact on individuals involved in the function, jobs, or bonuses.
In the case of public money, the drivers may be less direct, but emotional nonetheless. Transparent governance is often cited as a long pole in the tent for effective decision-making, but add to this the notion that divestments are harder than investments, and the problem compounds (United Nations, 2003) . Criteria-driven accountability and evidence-and performance-based management become crucial to preparing good investment and divestment decisions because they allow decisions to have a basis besides emotion. The absence of such criteria also results in organizations optimizing locally as opposed to the enterprise level; the end state is uncoordinated at best, and likely suboptimal for the enterprise. Without objective, consistently applied criteria, there is no repeatable, impartial way to assess performance of sub-organizations and sub-objectives and how they ^Åèìáëáíáçå=oÉëÉ~êÅÜ=mêçÖê~ãW= êÉ~íáåÖ=póåÉêÖó=Ñçê=fåÑçêãÉÇ=`Ü~åÖÉ= -230 -contribute to the success of the overall enterprise. Effective governance of these choices relies on symmetric and shared awareness of the impacts on enterprise goals and an understanding of the associated risks so informed resource decisions can be made. This paper proposes three criteria to enable the needed assessments:
1. Organizational and operational impacts: impact of decision on outcomes and enterprise goals 2. Performance viability: measurable performance of capabilities that are/are not core competencies for the mission and organizational outcomes 3. Economic value: investment costs and economic value of the investment/divestment set
The Priority Order of Divestment May Not Be the Opposite of the Priority Order of Investment
In the context of organizational decision-making, the list from which divestments are selected is not necessarily the opposite of the list of proposed investments. This is true for two main reasons:
 Synergy and scale: The whole is sometimes greater than the sum of its parts. Interdependencies may not be exposed until all the pieces are put together, and an attempt is made to break the whole apart or remove a part. Without tracked data supporting key types of criteria, the imperfect information and lack of causality in measurement causes pause when divestment proposals are made (Ebrahim & Rangan, 2010) .  No financial meter or value proposition: In public goods environments, such as Defense, the lack of a "bottom line" makes comparing the value of both investment and divestment choices difficult. For example, which is more important: a weapons platform, cyber security, the network, or force protection? Size of budgets becomes a meter and this does not promote divestment, nor does a notion of "affordability," which is challenging to define and execute (see findings and progress at MORS, n.d.). In addition to the uncertainties and omissions in decision making, cognitive biases may reinforce predisposed notions regarding investment or divestment options. Table 1 provides a summary of cognitive biases in the context of acquisition or divestment decisionmaking that are shown to result in rules of thumb (RoTs) that are used to make decisions in the absence of a performance-or evidence-based approach (Duhaime & Schwenk, 1985) . Without a data-driven understanding of the operational impacts and fiscal portfolio implications of investment sets, reasoning by analogy can turn perceived familiarity ("We have always done it this way.") into a strategic error about projected outcomes and organizational and operational impacts. If not measured and tracked, the impacts generated by a particular investment set are easy to over-estimate with the illusion of control. This is especially true when emotional biases come into play (e.g., the idea that a broken program is fixable and is better than no program at all). Additionally, escalating commitment may arise, especially when a project is failing. Personal commitment to "save" the situation is natural for risk-averse thinkers. Risk averseness has been shown to increase with wealth, and should be relatively high for government fiscal stewards. 5 These biases cloud the perception of performance viability, and true economic value of available options is not considered well enough to substantiate decisions. These all result in rules of thumb (RoTs) to help deal with complexity and ambiguity but yield poor choices (Center for the Study of Intelligence, 1999).
The Government Environment Arrives at Its Own "Rules of Thumb"
In the absence of shared awareness, legislatively required governance, constraints or negative feedback mechanisms, and evidence or performance driven decisions, public organizations generally end up with RoTs or traditions that appear to overcome common sense (see Table 2 ). 6 The outcomes of low rigor can be inefficiencies and/or omissions that cause errors in decision-making in the aggregate, even though they may not have been made at the aggregate level. 
Business Best Practices to Deal With Cognitive Biases
Because risks and returns are involved in divestment choices, the private sector has developed best practices (Mankins, Harding, & Weddigen, 2008) . Table 3 compares best business practices against the DoD's common government practice.
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Towards a Solution
The model presented here proposes that decisions should be made based on three key factors when selecting investments or divestments (Campbell & Whitehead, 2014) :
 Strategic value: the criticality of the investment to operations of the enterprise  Performance: potential to improve the business or create synergy with other businesses  Economic value: net present value (NPV), capital flows (capital required and lifecycle efficiencies), and external or secondary effects
The Proposed Framework and Criteria Figure 1 below diagrams the investment/divestment logic for a commercial business (Suozzo, 2001 ). There are three general cases in Figure 1: (1) "obvious" buy/sell cases, (2) situations where the candidate is not strategic, and (3) cases where the candidate is strategic, but the required competencies or cost advantages are not necessarily evident. These latter two cases are most interesting for investment houses, but they are all interesting for government, because even "obvious" buys are an opportunity cost of another ^Åèìáëáíáçå=oÉëÉ~êÅÜ=mêçÖê~ãW= êÉ~íáåÖ=póåÉêÖó=Ñçê=fåÑçêãÉÇ=`Ü~åÖÉ= -234 -choice, so they must not only answer "Yes" to all three criteria, but the choice must also surpass the holistic value of competitors for the resources. But what about self-interest and emotion? The "unmaking" of a product line? The transition of support to potential partners? These factors alter the speed and cost of transition, which are guided efficiently by negative feedback mechanisms that ensure survival (Hardin, 1968). 9 How might this apply to the DoD? For example, in response to wars, a DoD resource manager may choose to invest because the capability is strategic and high performing, but refuse to consider the high budget share and opportunity cost, or the risks that are unknown, or because the impacts to the defense industrial base are unacceptable. We end up with an array of buried or obfuscated investments that would benefit from an independent divestment panel equivalent. Figure 2 presents a proposed mapping of the business model to the DoD's key drivers. Not only are the DoD resource concepts of Readiness, Modernization, and Force Structure attributes that the DoD seeks, but they are also Resource areas reflected in the budget (Trunkey, 2013 At any given time, resources are developing, equipping, organizing, training, sustaining, and manning the force, and many dollars may "cross-over" and affect other resource pools. The high manpower of the 1950s shows the human warfighting power needed in the Korean War, the high Readiness costs in the wars since 9/11 shows the force is highly equipped for operations, and the increase in modernization of the 1980s shows the DoD's strategy to the Cold War.
These appear to be logical given the environments, but there is no objective way to assess the relative goodness of the decisions here. Additionally, a criticism across the three DoD processes-Requirements, Acquisition, and Budgeting-are that the criteria used for decision-making are not defined or well-coordinated (Defense Business Board, 2012): ^Åèìáëáíáçå=oÉëÉ~êÅÜ=mêçÖê~ãW= êÉ~íáåÖ=póåÉêÖó=Ñçê=fåÑçêãÉÇ=`Ü~åÖÉ= -236 - The processes do not have contemporaneous objectives (some are farther out than others).  They track the resource pools differently: joint capability areas, program executive office families, Budget Activities, Program Elements, Appropriations, etc.  DoD goal achievement is not measured, tracked, or aligned to resource pools to measure any kind of efficacy of planning or delivery. While Figure 3 reflects the striking of an appropriate balance, it is impossible to determine within the current construct what balances have been achieved (Sledge, 2010) . Figure 4 provides a summary of the model developed in this paper and shows how an analyst can arrive at answering "Yes" or "No" to the evaluation criteria proposed. Figure 5 borrows the logic from Figure 2 and puts the concepts in DoD terms to propose a set of criteria to assess such balance. This modified framework applied to the DoD should enable the use of a common language and valuation approach so that decisions could be made on common criteria of readiness (operational effectiveness), modernization (capability performance promise), and force structure efficacy (sustainable cost). Every investment set can be assessed against these three concepts with a "Yes" or "No" answer. We assume that all investments are compared from an end-to-end basis. Congress uses DoD-provided quarterly readiness assessments to determine resourcing requirements of the military (Trunkey, 2013) . Therefore, any resource-consuming activity that occurs within the DoD should promote or support readiness either directly or indirectly. If a relationship between an activity and readiness cannot be demonstrated or articulated, then the determination should be "No" to this criterion. All investment sets could be placed in a priority order of Readiness contributions, and a cut line could be established.
^Åèìáëáíáçå=oÉëÉ~êÅÜ=mêçÖê~ãW= êÉ~íáåÖ=póåÉêÖó=Ñçê=fåÑçêãÉÇ=`Ü~åÖÉ= -238 -Much effort is spent assessing how to measure how the DoD resources readiness, in addition to measuring Readiness levels. 11 The assessments are for units ("unit readiness") and organizations within the military departments, which is not necessarily about an investment but the ability of the outputs supported to fill the critical operational logic presumed for the mission. Note that it is possible for an investment to have a "No" determination for this criterion and still be a viable investment choice. For example, activities that do not have a visible impact on the effectiveness of units but that allow them to execute their missions more efficiently or economically could be viable investment candidates.
To meet Criteria 1, the investment set must meet critical equipping, training, and operations needs for current or future missions of critical Combatant Command forces or be vital to the accomplishment of a QDR Goal. 12 Outcome indicators are needed for each investment set to track expectations of impact.
Criteria #2: Core Competency, High Performance, or Modernized
To satisfy Criteria #2, investment sets should be able to answer one or more of the following:
 Development System (JCIDS) Manual provides a guide to parameterizing performance, which is a full array of metrics to gauge performance of a military system's actual and projected performance: Capability Performance (each JCA has defined performance attributes), Force Protection, Survivability, Sustainment (which includes Reliability and operating and sustainment costs), Net-Readiness, Training, and Energy (CJCS, 2012b). 14 Even if an investment set is not in the JCIDS process, these serve as holistic and common criteria.  Is the Modernization contribution needed? The age distribution of investments in the capability area within which the investment set lies suggests the importance of modernization to the capability area, and the degree to which the funds supporting the investment set in question are value-added. A third metric would assess the degree of modernization existent in the capability area and the expectation of the investment set's contribution to this maturity. This would include market research on the DoD's need to have a leading edge capability.
Criteria #3: Economically Sound or Force Structure Supportable
Investors solely seeking a return on investment (ROI) have beliefs about factors such as strategic value and performance for their financial needs. These beliefs lead to levels of confidence in investing, which in turn drive preferences over how much to change from, or divest from, their status quo portfolio. The preferences translate into behaviors such as larger numbers of trades or wider stock diversification. Investors using more highly informed analytics traded more (and therefore divested more), had more diverse portfolios, and had higher returns (Hoffman et al., 2010) . With the general objective to manage the risk profile of their consumption stream, investors of all risk types (from low to high: retirement, financial diversification, capital growth, hobby, speculation) have various tendencies to "stick to the status quo" and not divest. 15
Leveraging Other Fields: Social Return on Investment & Insurance Models
This evidence encourages the proposed DoD divestment framework to include an economic soundness calculation that shows savings or efficiencies for the budget environment (Moore, 2009 ) and consider a wider measure of Social Return on Investment (SROI). Not only will the SROI calculation consider the value of strategic impact and performance, the SROI concept takes into account two new variables-secondary effects ^Åèìáëáíáçå=oÉëÉ~êÅÜ=mêçÖê~ãW= êÉ~íáåÖ=póåÉêÖó=Ñçê=fåÑçêãÉÇ=`Ü~åÖÉ= -240 -and deadweight (Rauscher, Schober, & Miller, 2012) -that make divestment decisions more difficult (Rauscher et al., 2012, p. 6) :  Secondary effects include impacts on other portfolios, including intended externalities and unintended consequences (e.g., the effects on other portfolios or the defense industrial base as a result of terminating a program). Enterprise architectures and cross portfolio management should capture and account for these.  Deadweight is a placeholder for the levels of productivity or outcome changes that would have happened anyway, without the intervention (e.g., technology obsolescence or a politically driven decision to withdraw troops). The intent is to factor out double counting, especially if more than one or a complex intervention is being assessed. Based on models of social investment, social entrepreneurship, and venture philanthropy, the SROI model captures varied types of impacts and outcomes. It focuses on an investment "intervention" at the enterprise, program, or project level. In addition to mission effects, their SROI calculation includes how the intervention affects how the organization functions as well-activity efficiencies-through the size of secondary and deadweight effects, as shown in Figure 6 .
Time and portfolio averages taken from the insurance industry as variables that impact actuarial calculations are also worth considering here. For example, as the insurer of national security, the DoD's needs, risks, and cost patterns evolve with threat cohorts, weapons, and technology generations over time. How these factors may change and complicate lifecycle calculations for costs and returns cannot be overlooked (Lebar, 2012; Wadsworth & Woodley, 2013) . These added concepts parameterize factors that usually "blur" or are omitted from the standard DoD return on investment calculation, making divestment decisions more difficult. Figure 6 summarizes (Rauscher et al., 2012) In addition to Secondary Effects and Deadweight, our model leverages two factors from insurance modeling as important considerations (Lebar, 2012; Wadsworth & Woodley, 2013) :
 First, there is a time element critical to returns on the portfolio. Time is important because of the timed targets set in the plan and because performance of incoming investments in the intervention may be masked by portfolio-wide calculations of ROI. When older investments retire, the ROI for the portfolio may rise or fall dramatically.  Second, risk categorization errors may occur in NPV calculations. For example, models may rate a threat (or policy) being abated by the intervention as higher or lower than it should be. Not only will the error apply to the investments in the intervention, but it may also affect secondary effects or deadweight.
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What the Model Tells Us
While the detail in each criterion is potentially exhaustive, holistically the information derived from Figure 4 should address some of the biases discussed in Section 2.0 and enable improved decisions. Table 4 threads the constructs discussed in this paper. The generally omitted criterion in the first column leads to the cognitive bias usually relied upon in the second column. This leads to the DoD RoTs for divestment in the third column, to commercial best practices recommended to avoid mistakes typically made with these biases. These tie to the simple Yes/No criteria presented above. Create a database of Invest/Divest decisions, traceable to the three criteria, and to the actual results produced over time. This traceability is difficult, as investments get joined and split, and the investment decisions made at the time are often altered before investments are actually implemented. The intent can be tracked, however, and the investment and divestment strategies can be logically understood. This should help stage migration plans so that Divestments become part of the usual process. Make decisions using the proposed framework and encourage the use of analytics, tracked to productive implications.
Recommendation 3: Adopt an industry best practice of divestment panels as a way to promote the best use of resources instead of relying on rules of thumb as reliable predictors.
The DoD should adopt the framework described in the earlier section, Human Decisions: "Imperfect" Resorts to Rules of Thumb, as a method for determining investments with simple and meaningful criteria while at the same time employing a divestment panel as a portion of their means of governance.
It should also establish standing divestment panels comprised of non-advocates who report their results annually to senior Component leadership. Investment panels exist at many levels in the DoD, but per Title 10, the Secretary of Defense and the Military Secretaries have the final say on divestment.
The DoD has the ability to divest, for example, when politics calls for "peace dividends." In response to the 2011 Budget Control Act, the DoD was able to divest from $500 billion per year (7%-10% of totals, varied across organizations). The DoD reduced Force Structure and also found "efficiencies" under the oversight of Secretary Gates (see the Defense Strategic Guidance [DoD, 2012] ; DoD, 2010). Cuts can be taken in Strategic/Readiness endstrength equipping and training, Performance/Modernization upgrades to weapon and systems portfolios, or Economic/Force Structure areas of manpower-related investments. Savings take time to realize and are difficult to account for when continued operations and innovation are still taking place (Pellerin, 2013) .
The DoD also has the Issue Paper process supporting RMD-700, which allows community leaders across the DoD to recommend shifts of resources before the budget is finalized. Money moved in this process is usually a small fraction of total spending and is considered fallout from the annual budgeting process (Huo, 2011; USD[C], 2013) . 16 Both types of formal divestment processes are normal parts of the current bureaucracy, but do not necessarily illustrate a governance process relying on an informed thought construct to foster and maintain a forward-looking, innovative organization. ^Åèìáëáíáçå=oÉëÉ~êÅÜ=mêçÖê~ãW= êÉ~íáåÖ=póåÉêÖó=Ñçê=fåÑçêãÉÇ=`Ü~åÖÉ= -246 -In a budget-scarce environment, divestment strategies such as those recommended in this paper could prove to be useful for justification and selection of the "keeper" investment sets. The impact of a divestment panel could be measured. If the DoD captures and tracks distinct data on strategic impact, performance, and economic efficiencies, the DoD and Congress could reward good results with leadership recognition and continued fiscal support to sustain the positive pattern.
Summary and Conclusions
This paper outlined a logical investment/divestment choice structure that corrects old RoTs that predictably lead to suboptimal choices. It relies on decision-makers having the capability and reward structure to use such a structure in a complex environment. It assumes that the DoD institution would be motivated by Congress to hold decision-makers accountable, and in turn, these leaders would be rewarded for being responsive and productive in their choices. In this new frame, divestments would be seen as strategic opportunities, and the reward structure would incentivize accountability and measurable outcomes. The following are two recommended next steps:
 Design a tool for Preparation: Gather data to answer Yes/No questions; program tool to produce Invest/Divest choices; alter model's basis with events.  Use for effective Response: Use analytics to increase capability of leaders; link analytics to "accountability data"; and effectively reward organizations and their leaders.
